TVA's Dilemma: Accountability or Litigation Strategy?
TVA had a clear but difficult choice to make in the aftermath of the
Kingston Spill. One choice was to conduct a diligent review of TVA
management practices as well as to conduct a technical physical
examination of the failed structure and then to publish whatever was
discovered to the world. The second choice was to "circle the wagons,"
carefully craft press releases to project TVA in the most favorable light,
and to tightly control any reports done by TVA of the failure to minimize
legal liability. The first choice required a value judgment that a
government agency causing a major disaster affecting the lives and
property of citizens around the Kingston Fossil Fuel Plant should err on
the side of transparency and accountability. The downside to this choice
is providing fodder for plaintiffs in litigation against TVA and bringing
perhaps additional scrutiny on the agency.
The second choice also required a value judgment. That choice placed a
premium on the preservation of TVA assets and the protection of an
image of environmental stewardship. The advantage of this choice was
limiting legal liability which arguably inures to the benefit of ratepayers and
avoiding scrutiny of TVA management practices that might have
contributed to the Kingston Spill.
We are not privy to the calculation made by TVA as to the relative merits
of these two difficult choices. We are, however, privy to facts that suggest
a predictable outcome from TVA electing to go with the second choice.
And here's one that people in Roane County may be interested in:
TVA COULD HAVE POSSIBLY PREVENTED THE KINGSTON SPILL IF
IT HAD TAKEN RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
TVA had been made aware of certain "red flags" that were raised over a
long period of time signaling the need for safety modifications to TVA ash
ponds. These "red flags" were raised both by TVA employees and by
consultants hired by TVA. Specifically, a 1985 internal memorandum
written by a TVA engineer and two 2004 reports by external engineering
consultants raised concerns about the stability of the Kingston ash storage
facilities. For reasons that are still not entirely clear, appropriate safety
modifications were not made. Marshall Miller holds that TVA could have
possibly prevented the Kingston Spill if it had implemented the
recommended safety modifications.
In April 1985, an internal memorandum written by a TVA engineer raised
serious concerns about the stability of Dike C of the Kingston ash storage
facility. This memorandum states that Dike C had not been built
according to design drawings. It further states that the dike's "as built"
factor of safety was less than desirable and further recommended that plant personnel inspect Dike C daily.
And here's one for the EPA (maybe?):
We interviewed plant personnel, engineering personnel, and management and heard several comments indicative of a culture resistant to treating ash management as
much more than taking out the garbage. For example:
There's a lot more in the report, and it goes way beyond Kingston. TVA IG and contracted inspectors from Marshall Miller and Associates visited seven TVA plants (Bull Run Fossil• One member of management stated, "Ponds have always been the
back end of the plant. It is the same way at other utilities," indicating
that ponds are not an area of primary focus for utilities.
• Another employee said, "The further away from the plant you got the
less management seemed to care," conveying the ponds got little
attention because they were away from the plant and not directly
related to power production.
• A TVA engineer said TVA had always stacked ash higher at KIF so it
must be okay. He went on to say that if something worked in the past,
TVA will keep on doing it and that TVA had a cheap solution to ash
storage by stacking higher so that is what they did.
Plant, Cumberland Fossil Plant, Johnsonville Fossil Plant, John Sevier Fossil Plant, Kingston
Fossil Plant, Paradise Fossil Plant, and Widows Creek Fossil Plant) and found poorly maintained ash ponds, poor training (or none at all) for pond management personnel, and engineering and design standards that haven't been updated SINCE 1981.
Comments » 0
Be the first to post a comment!
Share your thoughts
Comments are the sole responsibility of the person posting them. You agree not to post comments that are off topic, defamatory, obscene, abusive, threatening or an invasion of privacy. Violators may be banned. Click here for our full user agreement.